Principal papel dos sistemas monetários e financeiros internacionais no comércio internacional

Papel principal dos sistemas monetários e financeiros internacionais no comércio internacional
Seção 6.1 "O que é o sistema monetário internacional?" discute como, durante a década de 1930, a Grande Depressão resultou em economias em falha. A queda do padrão-ouro levou os países a aumentar as barreiras comerciais, desvalorizar suas moedas para competir uns contra os outros pelos mercados de exportação e restringir o uso de divisas pelos seus cidadãos. Todos esses fatores levaram à queda do comércio mundial, ao alto desemprego e à queda dos padrões de vida em muitos países. Em 1944, o Acordo de Bretton Woods estabeleceu um novo sistema monetário internacional. A criação do Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI) e do Banco Mundial foram dois dos seus legados mais duradouros.
O Banco Mundial e o FMI, muitas vezes chamados de Instituições de Bretton Woods, são dois pilares intergovernamentais que apoiam a estrutura da ordem econômica e financeira mundial. Ambos assumiram os papéis em expansão, e houve novos pedidos de expansão adicional de suas responsabilidades, particularmente na ausência contínua de um único acordo monetário global. As duas instituições podem parecer ter funções confusas ou sobrepostas. No entanto, embora existam algumas semelhanças (veja a figura a seguir), são duas organizações distintas com diferentes papéis.
"Apesar dessas e outras semelhanças, o Banco e o FMI continuam distintos. A diferença fundamental é esta: o Banco é principalmente uma instituição de desenvolvimento; O FMI é uma instituição cooperativa que procura manter um sistema ordenado de pagamentos e recibos entre países. Cada um tem um propósito diferente, uma estrutura distinta, recebe seu financiamento de diferentes fontes, auxilia diferentes categorias de membros e se esforça para atingir objetivos distintos através de métodos próprios. "David D. Driscoll," O FMI e o Banco Mundial: como Do They Differ ?, "Fundo Monetário Internacional, atualizado em agosto de 1996, acessado em 9 de fevereiro de 2018, imf / external / pubs / ft / exrp / differ / differ. htm (ênfase adicionada). Esta seção explora essas duas instituições e como elas evoluíram nos quase setenta anos desde sua criação.
Fundo Monetário Internacional.
História e Propósito.
Figura 6.1 Sede do FMI em Washington, DC.
Fonte: Fundo Monetário Internacional, 2018.
Os arquitetos do Acordo de Bretton Woods, John Maynard Keynes e Harry Dexter White, previram uma instituição que supervisionaria o sistema monetário internacional, as taxas de câmbio e os pagamentos internacionais para permitir que os países e seus cidadãos compram bens e serviços uns dos outros. Eles esperavam que esta nova entidade global assegurasse a estabilidade da taxa de câmbio e encorajasse seus países membros a eliminar as restrições cambiais que impediam o comércio. Oficialmente, o FMI surgiu em dezembro de 1945 com vinte e nove países membros. (Os soviéticos, que estavam em Bretton Woods, se recusaram a se juntar ao FMI.)
Em 1947, o primeiro ano formal de operações da instituição, os franceses se tornaram a primeira nação a emprestar do FMI. Nos próximos trinta anos, mais países se juntaram ao FMI, incluindo alguns países africanos na década de 1960. As nações do bloco soviético continuaram a ser a excepção e não faziam parte do FMI até a queda do Muro de Berlim em 1989. O FMI experimentou outro grande aumento nos membros na década de 1990 com a adição da Rússia; A Rússia também foi colocada no comitê executivo do FMI. Hoje, 187 países são membros do FMI; vinte e quatro desses países ou grupos de países estão representados no conselho executivo.
Os objetivos do Fundo Monetário Internacional são os seguintes:
Promover a cooperação monetária internacional através de uma instituição permanente que fornece o mecanismo de consulta e colaboração em problemas monetários internacionais. Para facilitar a expansão e o crescimento equilibrado do comércio internacional e contribuir desse modo para a promoção e manutenção de altos níveis de emprego e renda real e para o desenvolvimento dos recursos produtivos de todos os membros como objetivos primários da política econômica. Promover a estabilidade cambial, manter mecanismos de troca ordenados entre os membros e evitar a depreciação cambial competitiva. Auxiliar no estabelecimento de um sistema multilateral de pagamentos em relação às transações correntes entre membros e na eliminação de restrições cambiais que dificultam o crescimento do comércio mundial. Dar confiança aos membros, disponibilizando temporariamente os recursos gerais do Fundo sob salvaguardas adequadas, proporcionando-lhes assim a oportunidade de corrigir os desajustes em sua balança de pagamentos sem recorrer a medidas destrutivas da prosperidade nacional ou internacional. De acordo com o acima exposto, reduzir a duração e diminuir o grau de desequilíbrio nos saldos internacionais de pagamentos dos membros. "Artigos do Acordo: Artigo I-Propósitos," Fundo Monetário Internacional, acessado em 23 de maio de 2018, imf / external / pubs / ft / aa / aa01.htm.
Além da assistência financeira, o FMI também oferece aos países membros assistência técnica para criar e implementar políticas efetivas, em especial políticas e regulamentos econômicos, monetários e bancários.
Direitos especiais de saque (SDRs)
Um direito de desenho especial (SDR) Um bem de reserva monetária internacional do FMI. é basicamente um ativo de reserva monetária internacional. Os SDRs foram criados em 1969 pelo FMI em resposta ao Paradox de Triffin. O Paradox de Triffin afirmou que quanto mais dólares americanos fossem usados ​​como moeda de reserva básica, menos fé os países possuíam na capacidade do governo dos EUA de converter esses dólares em ouro. O mundo ainda estava usando o sistema de Bretton Woods, e a expectativa inicial era que os DSE substituíssem o dólar americano pela moeda da reserva monetária global, resolvendo assim o Paradoxo de Triffin. Bretton Woods entrou em colapso alguns anos depois, mas o conceito de SDR solidificou. Hoje, o valor de um SDR consiste no valor de quatro das moedas dos maiores membros do FMI - o dólar dos EUA, a libra britânica, o iene japonês e o euro -, mas as moedas não possuem igual peso. Os DSE são cotados em dólares americanos. A cesta, ou o grupo de moedas, é revisado a cada cinco anos pelo conselho executivo do FMI e é baseado no papel da moeda no comércio internacional e nas finanças. O quadro a seguir mostra a avaliação atual nas porcentagens das quatro moedas.
O SDR não é uma moeda, mas alguns referem-se a ela como uma forma de moeda do FMI. Não constitui uma reivindicação sobre o FMI, que serve apenas para fornecer um mecanismo para comprar, vender e trocar SDRs. Os países dispõem de DSE, que estão incluídos nas reservas do país membro. Os SDRs podem ser trocados entre países e moedas. O SDR serve como a unidade de conta do FMI e algumas outras organizações internacionais, e os países emprestam do FMI em DSE em tempos de necessidade econômica.
O papel atual do FMI e os principais desafios e oportunidades.
Crítica e áreas desafiadoras para o FMI.
O FMI apoia muitos países em desenvolvimento, ajudando-os a superar os desafios monetários e a manter um sistema financeiro internacional estável. Apesar deste propósito claramente definido, a execução de seu trabalho pode ser muito complicada e pode ter grandes repercussões para as nações receptoras. Como resultado, o FMI tem seus críticos e seus apoiantes. Os desafios para organizações como o FMI e o Banco Mundial não apenas em algumas das suas deficiências operacionais, mas também no ambiente político global em que operam. O FMI tem sido sujeito a uma série de críticas que geralmente se concentram nas condições de seus empréstimos, na falta de responsabilidade e na disposição de emprestar para países com registros de direitos humanos ruins. David N. Balaam e Michael Veseth, Introdução à Economia Política Internacional, 4ª ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education International / Prentice Hall), 2005.
Essas críticas incluem o seguinte:
Condições para empréstimos. O FMI torna o empréstimo concedido aos países condicionados à implementação de certas políticas econômicas, que tipicamente incluem o seguinte:
Reduzir o endividamento do governo (impostos mais altos e menores gastos) Taxas de juros mais elevadas para estabilizar a moeda Permitir que as empresas que falham fallem Ajuste estrutural (privatização, desregulamentação, redução de corrupção e burocracia) "Crítica do FMI", Ajuda Econômica, acessada em 28 de junho de 2018, Economicshelp / dictionary / i / imf-criticism. html.
As políticas austera funcionaram às vezes, mas sempre extraem um pedaço político, pois o impacto nos cidadãos comuns geralmente é bastante severo. O caso de abertura no Capítulo 2 "Comércio Internacional e Investimento Estrangeiro Direto" apresenta o impacto atual das políticas do FMI na Grécia. Alguns sugerem que as condições do empréstimo são "baseadas no chamado" Consenso de Washington ", focado na liberalização do comércio, investimento e setor financeiro, desregulamentação e privatização das indústrias nacionalizadas. Muitas vezes, as condicionalidades são anexadas sem o devido respeito pelas circunstâncias individuais dos países mutuários e as recomendações prescritas pelo Banco Mundial e pelo FMI não conseguem resolver os problemas econômicos nos países. As condicionalidades do FMI podem, adicionalmente, resultar na perda da autoridade de um estado para governar sua própria economia à medida que as políticas econômicas nacionais são predeterminadas nos pacotes do FMI. "" Quais são as principais preocupações e críticas sobre o Banco Mundial e o FMI? ", Projeto Bretton Woods, janeiro 25, 2007, acessado em 9 de fevereiro de 2018, brettonwoodsproject / item. shtml? X = 320869.
Oportunidades e perspectivas futuras para o FMI.
A crise econômica global de 2008 é uma das situações mais difíceis que o FMI teve de enfrentar desde a Grande Depressão.
Durante a maior parte da primeira década do século XXI, o comércio e as finanças mundiais alimentaram uma expansão global que permitiu que muitos países pagassem qualquer dinheiro que tivessem emprestado do FMI e de outros credores oficiais. Esses países também usaram excedentes no comércio para acumular reservas cambiais. A crise econômica global que começou com o colapso de 2007 dos empréstimos hipotecários nos Estados Unidos e espalhados pelo mundo em 2008 foi precedida por grandes desequilíbrios nos fluxos de capital globais. Os fluxos de capital globais flutuaram entre 2 e 6% do PIB mundial entre 1980 e 1995, mas desde então aumentaram para 15% do PIB. O aumento mais rápido já foi experimentado pelas economias avançadas, mas os mercados emergentes e os países em desenvolvimento também se tornaram mais integrados financeiramente.
Os fundadores do sistema de Bretton Woods tinham dado por certo que os fluxos de capital privado nunca mais retomariam o papel proeminente que tinham no século XIX e início do século XX, e o FMI tradicionalmente emprestou aos membros que enfrentavam dificuldades de conta corrente. A crise global de 2008 revelou fragilidade nos avançados mercados financeiros que logo levaram à pior crise global desde a Grande Depressão. De repente, o FMI foi inundado com pedidos de acordos de reserva e outras formas de apoio financeiro e político.
A comunidade internacional reconheceu que os recursos financeiros do FMI eram tão importantes como sempre e provavelmente se esticariam antes que a crise acabasse. Com o amplo apoio dos países credores, a capacidade de crédito do FMI triplicou para cerca de US $ 750 bilhões. Para usar esses fundos efetivamente, o FMI revisou suas políticas de empréstimos. Ele criou uma linha de crédito flexível para países com sólidos fundamentos econômicos e um histórico de implementação bem sucedida de políticas. Outras reformas visavam países de baixa renda. Esses fatores permitiram ao FMI desembolsar somas muito grandes rapidamente; os desembolsos foram baseados nas necessidades dos países emprestados e não foram tão limitados por cotas como no passado. "Globalização e Crise (2005-Presente)", Fundo Monetário Internacional, acessado em 26 de julho de 2018, imf / external / about / histglob. htm.
Muitos observadores acreditam as respostas rápidas e o papel de liderança do FMI para ajudar a evitar uma crise financeira global potencialmente pior. Conforme observado no capítulo 5 "Caso de abertura de Cooperação e Integração Econômica Global e Regional" na Grécia, o FMI tem desempenhado um papel para ajudar os países a evitar desastres financeiros generalizados. Os requisitos do FMI nem sempre são populares, mas geralmente são efetivos, o que levou a sua crescente influência. O FMI procurou corrigir algumas das críticas; De acordo com um ensaio de política externa em foco, destinado a estimular o diálogo sobre o FMI, os pontos fortes e oportunidades do fundo incluem o seguinte:
Flexibilidade e velocidade. "Em março de 2009, o FMI criou a Flexible Credit Line (FCL), que é uma facilidade de empréstimo de rápido desembolso com baixa condicionalidade voltada para tranquilizar os investidores, injetando liquidez ... Tradicionalmente, os programas de empréstimo do FMI exigem a imposição de medidas de austeridade, como o aumento do interesse taxas que podem reduzir o investimento estrangeiro ... No caso da FCL, os países se qualificam para isso não com base em suas promessas, mas com base em sua história. Assim como os mutuários individuais com bons antecedentes de crédito são elegíveis para empréstimos com taxas de juros mais baixas do que suas contrapartes de risco, da mesma forma, países com fundamentos macroeconômicos sólidos são elegíveis para os desenhos no FCL. Um programa semelhante foi proposto para países de baixa renda. Conhecido como o mecanismo de crédito rápido, ele é carregado de frente (permitindo um pagamento único e inicial como com o FCL) e também se destina a ter baixa condicionalidade. "Martin S. Edwards," O novo kit de ferramentas do FMI: novas oportunidades , Old Challenges, "Foreign Policy in Focus, 17 de setembro de 2009, acessado em 28 de junho de 2018, fpif / articles / the_imfs_new_toolkit_new_opportunities_old_challenges. Cheerleading. "O Fundo está se posicionando para ser menos um adversário e mais uma líder de torcida para os países membros. Para alguns países que precisam de empréstimos mais para garantir que a reforma, essas mudanças no kit de ferramentas do Fundo são bem-vindas. "Martin S. Edwards," O novo kit de ferramentas do FMI: novas oportunidades, velhos desafios ", política externa em foco, 17 de setembro de 2009, acessado em 28 de junho de 2018, fpif / articles / the_imfs_new_toolkit_new_opportunities_old_challenges. Isso permite uma maior estabilidade política e econômica doméstica. Adaptabilidade. "Em vez de fornecer o mesmo remédio para todos os países, independentemente dos seus problemas específicos, as novas facilidades de crédito destinam-se a ajudar os governos reformados fornecendo recursos a curto prazo para tranquilizar os investidores. Desta forma, eles ajudam os políticos nos países em desenvolvimento a gerenciar os custos negativos da integração ". Martin S. Edwards," O Novo Kit de Ferramentas do FMI: Novas Oportunidades, Velhos Desafios ", Política Externa em Foco, 17 de setembro de 2009, acessado em 28 de junho, 2018, fpif / articles / the_imfs_new_toolkit_new_opportunities_old_challenges. Transparência. O FMI esforçou-se por melhorar a sua própria transparência e continua a encorajar os países membros a fazê-lo. Os defensores observam que isso cria uma barreira para qualquer um ou mais países que tenham mais influência geopolítica na organização. Na realidade, as principais economias continuam a exercer influência nas políticas e na implementação.
Para sublinhar as expectativas globais do papel do FMI, a China, a Rússia e outras economias globais renovaram os pedidos para o G20 substituir o dólar dos EUA pela moeda de reserva internacional por um novo sistema global controlado pelo FMI.
O Financial Times informou que Zhou Xiaochuan, o governador do banco central chinês, disse que o objetivo seria criar uma moeda de reserva desconectada de países individuais e capaz de permanecer estável a longo prazo, eliminando assim as deficiências inerentes ao uso de crédito com base em moedas nacionais. "Este é um sinal claro de que a China, como o maior detentor de ativos financeiros em dólares norte-americanos, está preocupada com o potencial risco inflacionário do dinheiro da impressão no Federal Reserve dos EUA", disse Qu Hongbin, economista chefe da China para o HSBC. "Jamil Anderlini, "A China solicita nova moeda da reserva", Financial Times, 24 de março de 2009, acessada em 9 de fevereiro de 2018, ft / cms / s / 0 / 7851925a-17a2-11de-8c9d-0000779fd2ac. html # axzz1DTvW5KyI.
Embora o Sr. Zhou não mencionou o dólar dos EUA, o ensaio fez uma crítica pontual do sistema monetário atual dominado pelo dólar:
"O surgimento da crise [atual] e seus spillover para o mundo inteiro refletiram as vulnerabilidades inerentes e os riscos sistêmicos no sistema monetário internacional existente", escreveu o Sr. Zhou.
A China tem pouca escolha senão manter a maior parte de seus US $ 2.000 bilhões de reservas cambiais em dólares americanos, e é improvável que isso mude no futuro próximo.
Para substituir o sistema atual, o Sr. Zhou sugeriu ampliar o papel dos direitos de desenho especiais, que foram introduzidos pelo FMI em 1969 para apoiar o regime de câmbio fixo de Bretton Woods, mas tornaram-se menos relevantes uma vez que entraram em colapso na década de 1970 ....
O Sr. Zhou disse que a proposta exigiria "visão política extraordinária e coragem" e reconheceu uma dívida com John Maynard Keynes, que fez uma sugestão semelhante na década de 1940. Jamil Anderlini, "A China solicita nova moeda da reserva", Financial Times, 24 de março de 2009, acessada em 9 de fevereiro de 2018, ft / cms / s / 0 / 7851925a-17a2-11de-8c9d-0000779fd2ac. html # axzz1DTvW5KyI.
A China é politicamente e economicamente motivada para recomendar uma moeda de reserva alternativa. Politicamente, o país cuja moeda é a moeda de reserva é percebido como o poder econômico dominante, como a Seção 6.1 "O que é o sistema monetário internacional?" discute. Economicamente, a China sofreu uma crescente pressão global para aumentar o valor de sua moeda, o renminbi, que a Secção 6.3 "Entendendo como a política monetária internacional, o FMI e as práticas comerciais de impacto do Banco Mundial" discute em maior profundidade.
O Banco Mundial eo Grupo do Banco Mundial.
História e Propósito.
Figura 6.2 Sede do Banco Mundial em Washington, DC.
Fonte: Banco Mundial, 2018.
O Banco Mundial surgiu em 1944 na conferência de Bretton Woods. Seu nome formal é o Banco Internacional de Reconstrução e Desenvolvimento (BIRD), que claramente declara seu principal objetivo de financiar o desenvolvimento econômico. Os primeiros empréstimos do Banco Mundial foram prorrogados no final da década de 1940 para financiar a reconstrução das economias devastadas pela guerra da Europa Ocidental. Quando essas nações recuperaram alguma medida de auto-suficiência econômica, o Banco Mundial voltou sua atenção para ajudar as nações mais pobres do mundo. O Banco Mundial tem um propósito central: promover o progresso econômico e social nos países em desenvolvimento, ajudando a aumentar a produtividade para que suas pessoas possam viver uma vida melhor e mais plena:
[Em 2009], o Banco Mundial forneceu US $ 46,9 bilhões para 303 projetos em países em desenvolvimento em todo o mundo, com nossa expertise financeira e / ou técnica para ajudar esses países a reduzir a pobreza.
Atualmente, o Banco está envolvido em mais de 1.800 projetos em praticamente todos os setores e países em desenvolvimento. Os projetos são tão diversos como o fornecimento de microcrédito na Bósnia e Herzegovina, aumentando a conscientização sobre a prevenção da AIDS na Guiné, apoiando a educação das meninas em Bangladesh, melhorando a prestação de cuidados de saúde no México e ajudando a reconstrução de Timor-Leste após a independência e a Índia reconstruir o Gujarat após um devastador terremoto . "Projetos", o Banco Mundial, acessado em 9 de fevereiro de 2018, go. worldbank / M7ARDFNB60.
Hoje, o Banco Mundial é composto por dois órgãos principais, o Banco Internacional de Reconstrução e Desenvolvimento (BIRD) e a Associação Internacional de Desenvolvimento (IDA), criada em 1960. O Banco Mundial faz parte do grupo mais amplo do Banco Mundial, que consiste em cinco Instituições inter-relacionadas: o BIRD; a IDA; a Corporação Financeira Internacional (IFC), que foi criada em 1956; A Agência Multilateral de Garantia de Investimentos (MIGA), que foi criada em 1988; e o Centro Internacional de Solução de Disputas de Investimento (ICSID), que foi criado em 1966. Esses membros adicionais do Grupo do Banco Mundial também têm propósitos específicos. A IDA normalmente fornece empréstimos sem juros para países com garantias soberanas. O IFC fornece empréstimos, equidade, ferramentas de gerenciamento de risco e financiamento estruturado. Seu objetivo é facilitar o desenvolvimento sustentável através da melhoria dos investimentos no setor privado. O MIGA concentra-se na melhoria do investimento estrangeiro direto dos países em desenvolvimento. O ICSID fornece um meio para a resolução de disputas entre governos e investidores privados com o objetivo final de aumentar o fluxo de capital.
O foco principal atual do Banco Mundial centra-se em seis temas estratégicos:
Os países mais pobres. Redução da pobreza e crescimento sustentável nos países mais pobres, especialmente na África. Postconflicto e estados frágeis. Soluções para os desafios especiais dos países pós-conflitos e estados frágeis. Países de renda média. Soluções de desenvolvimento com serviços personalizados, bem como financiamento para países de renda média. Bens públicos globais. Abordar questões regionais e globais que atravessam fronteiras nacionais, como mudanças climáticas, doenças infecciosas e comércio. O mundo árabe. Maior desenvolvimento e oportunidade no mundo árabe. Conhecimento e aprendizagem. Aproveitando o melhor conhecimento global para apoiar o desenvolvimento. "Para enfrentar desafios globais, seis temas estratégicos", o Banco Mundial, acessado em 9 de fevereiro de 2018, go. worldbank / 56O9ZVPO70.
O Banco Mundial oferece empréstimos com juros baixos, créditos sem juros e subsídios para países em desenvolvimento. Existe sempre uma garantia de reembolso do governo (ou "soberana") em condições gerais. O Banco Mundial é direcionado para fazer empréstimos para projetos, mas nunca para financiar um déficit comercial. Esses empréstimos devem ter uma probabilidade razoável de serem reembolsados. A IDA foi criada para oferecer uma opção alternativa de empréstimo. Os empréstimos da IDA são livres de interesse e oferecidos por várias décadas, com um período de carência de dez anos antes do país receber o empréstimo deve começar o reembolso. Esses empréstimos geralmente são chamados de empréstimos empobrecidos feitos por uma organização internacional. Neste capítulo, a IDA é uma opção a longo prazo para os países. Estes empréstimos não têm interesse e têm um período de carência de várias décadas para reembolso. Existe também a possibilidade de o país não devolver o empréstimo. .
Uma vez que emitiu os seus primeiros títulos em 1947, o BIRD gera fundos para o seu trabalho de desenvolvimento através dos mercados de capitais internacionais (que cobre o Capítulo 7 "Câmbio e Mercado Global de Capitais"). O Banco Mundial emite títulos, geralmente cerca de US $ 25 bilhões por ano. Esses títulos são classificados AAA (a classificação mais alta possível) porque eles são apoiados pelo capital compartilhado dos Estados membros e pelas garantias soberanas dos mutuários. Devido à classificação de crédito AAA, o Banco Mundial pode pedir empréstimos a taxas de juros relativamente baixas. Isso fornece uma fonte de financiamento mais barata para os países em desenvolvimento, já que a maioria dos países em desenvolvimento tem classificações de crédito consideravelmente baixas. O Banco Mundial cobra uma taxa de cerca de 1 por cento para cobrir os gastos gerais administrativos.
Qual é o papel atual do Banco Mundial e principais desafios e oportunidades?
Como o FMI, o Banco Mundial possui críticas e seus apoiantes. As críticas do Banco Mundial se estendem dos desafios que enfrenta no ambiente operacional global. Alguns desses desafios têm causas complicadas; alguns resultam do conflito entre as nações e da crise financeira global. Os seguintes são quatro exemplos das difíceis necessidades do mundo que o Banco Mundial tenta abordar:
Mesmo em 2018, mais de 3 bilhões de pessoas viviam com menos de US $ 2,50 por dia. No início do século XXI, quase um bilhão de pessoas não conseguiam ler um livro ou assinar seus nomes. Menos de 1 por cento do que o mundo gasta anualmente em armas teria colocado todas as crianças na escola até o ano 2000, mas isso não aconteceu. Estados frágeis como o Afeganistão, o Ruanda e o Sri Lanka enfrentam graves desafios de desenvolvimento: capacidade institucional fraca, governança pobre, instabilidade política e, muitas vezes, violência em andamento ou o legado do conflito passado. Anup Shah, "Causas da Pobreza", Questões Globais, modificado pela última vez em 25 de abril de 2018, acessado em 1 de agosto de 2018, questões globais / questão / 2 / causas de pobreza.
De acordo com a Enciclopédia da Nova Nação Americana e do New York Times, o Banco Mundial é criticado principalmente pelas seguintes razões:
Incompetência administrativa. O Banco Mundial e suas práticas de empréstimos são cada vez mais escrutados, com os críticos afirmando que "o Banco Mundial passou de ser um" credor de último recurso "para uma organização internacional de bem-estar", resultando em uma instituição "inchada, incompetente e até mesmo" corrupto ". Também incriminatório é que" os padrões de empréstimos vagos do banco levaram a uma carteira de empréstimos em rápida deterioração ". Enciclopédia da Nova Nação Americana, sv," Fundo Monetário Internacional e Banco Mundial - Críticos do Banco Mundial à direita e à esquerda " acessado em 29 de junho de 2018, relações americanas / EN / International-Monetary-Fund-e-World-Bank-World-bank-critics-on-right-and-left. html. Recompensar ou apoiar países ineficientes ou corruptos. As políticas de empréstimos do banco geralmente recompensam a ineficiência macroeconômica no mundo subdesenvolvido, permitindo que nações ineficientes evitem os tipos de reformas fundamentais que, no longo prazo, acabariam com a pobreza em seus países. Muitos analistas observam que o melhor exemplo é comparar.
o crescimento fantástico no Leste Asiático para as condições econômicas deploráveis ​​da África. Em 1950, as regiões eram iguais - a Coréia do Sul apresentava um PIB per capita mais baixo do que a Nigéria. Mas, ao buscar reformas macroeconômicas, economias elevadas, investir em educação e serviços sociais básicos e abrir suas economias para a ordem comercial global, os "Tigres do Pacífico" conseguiram sair da pobreza e da riqueza com muito pouca ajuda da Banco Mundial. Muitos países da África, no entanto, se basearam principalmente na assistência multilateral de organizações como o Banco Mundial, evitando reformas macroeconômicas fundamentais, com resultados deploráveis, mas previsíveis.
Os conservadores apontam que o Banco Mundial emprestou mais de US $ 350 bilhões ao longo de meio século, principalmente para o mundo subdesenvolvido, com pouco a mostrar por isso. Um estudo argumentou que dos sessenta e seis países que receberam financiamento do banco de 1975 a 2000, bem mais da metade não eram melhores do que antes, e vinte estavam realmente pior. O estudo apontou que o Níger recebeu $ 637 milhões entre 1965 e 1995, mas seu PNB per capita caiu, em termos reais, mais de 50% durante esse período. No mesmo período, Singapura, que recebeu um sétimo auxílio do Banco Mundial, viu o aumento do PNB per capita em mais de 6% ao ano. Enciclopédia da Nova Nação Americana, sv, "Fundo Monetário Internacional e Banco Mundial - Críticos do Banco Mundial à direita e à esquerda", acessado em 29 de junho de 2018, relações americanas / EN / International-Monetary-Fund-and-World-Bank-World - bank-critics-on-the-right-and-left. html.
Concentrando-se em grandes projetos em vez de iniciativas locais. Alguns críticos afirmam que os empréstimos do Banco Mundial dão preferência a "grandes projetos de infra-estrutura, como construção de barragens e usinas elétricas em projetos que beneficiam os pobres, como educação e cuidados de saúde básicos". Os projetos muitas vezes destroem o ambiente local, incluindo florestas, rios, e pesca. Algumas estimativas sugerem que "mais de dois milhões e meio de pessoas foram deslocadas por projetos tornados possíveis através de empréstimos do Banco Mundial". Projetos com falhas, argumentar ambientalistas e grupos de antiglobalização são particularmente ilustrativos: "A barragem de Sardar Sarovar no rio Narmada na Índia era esperado que deslocasse quase um quarto de milhão de pessoas em locais de reassentamento miseráveis. O esquema de desenvolvimento da fronteira Polonoroeste levou ao desmatamento em larga escala na floresta tropical brasileira. Na Tailândia, a barragem de Pak Mun destruiu as pescarias do rio Mun, empobrecendo milhares de pessoas que haviam feito a vida pescando e alterando para sempre a dieta da região. "Enciclopédia da Nova Nação Americana, Sv," Fundo Monetário Internacional e Banco Mundial - Críticos do Banco Mundial à direita e à esquerda, "acessado em 29 de junho de 2018, relações americanas / EN / International-Monetary-Fund-and-World-Bank-World-bank-critics-on-right-and-left. html . Além disso, os projetos maiores tornam-se alvo de corrupção pelos funcionários do governo local porque há tanto dinheiro envolvido.
Outro exemplo foi em 2009, quando uma auditoria interna descobriu que a IFC "ignorou seus próprios padrões de proteção ambiental e social quando aprovou quase US $ 200 milhões em garantias de empréstimos para a produção de óleo de palma na Indonésia ... A Indonésia é o lar das maiores reservas do mundo de florestas naturais e pântanos de turfa, que naturalmente atrapalham o dióxido de carbono - o principal gás com efeito de estufa que causa a mudança climática. Mas a destruição desenfreada das florestas para dar lugar a plantações de óleo de palma causou libertações gigantes de CO 2 na atmosfera, tornando a Indonésia o terceiro maior emissor de gases de efeito estufa do planeta ... "Para cada investimento, as pressões comerciais podiam prevalecer, "Os auditores escreveram." Lisa Friedman, "Como o Banco Mundial deixa de lidar com" Torch the Rainforests ", New York Times, 19 de agosto de 2009, acessado em 9 de fevereiro de 2018, nytimes / cwire / 2009/08/19 / 19climatewire - how-the-world-bank-let-deal-making-torch-the-33255.html. No entanto, tais questões nem sempre são tão claras quanto parecem. O IFC respondeu à auditoria reconhecendo "deficiências no processo de revisão. Mas o credor também defendeu o investimento na produção de óleo de palma como forma de aliviar a pobreza na Indonésia. "A IFC acredita que a produção de óleo de palma, quando realizada de forma ambientalmente e socialmente sustentável, pode fornecer apoio fundamental para uma economia rural forte, proporcionando emprego e melhor qualidade de vida para milhões de pobres rurais em áreas tropicais", afirmou. "Lisa Friedman," Como o Banco Mundial deixa de lidar com "Torch the Rainforests", New York Times, 19 de agosto de 2009, acessado em 9 de fevereiro de 2018, nytimes / cwire / 2009/08/19 / 19climatewire-how-the - world-bank-let-deal-making-torch-the-33255.html.
Oportunidades e perspectivas futuras para o Banco Mundial.
Por mais vocais que sejam os críticos do Banco Mundial, também são seus apoiantes. O Banco Mundial é elogiado por muitos por se envolver em projetos de desenvolvimento em locais remotos em todo o mundo para melhorar os padrões de vida e reduzir a pobreza. The World Bank’s current focus is on helping countries achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which are eight international development goals, established in 2000 at the Millennium Summit, that all 192 United Nations member states and twenty-three international organizations have agreed to achieve by the year 2018. They include reducing extreme poverty, reducing child mortality rates, fighting disease epidemics such as AIDS, and developing a global partnership for development. The World Bank is focused on the following four key issues:
Increased transparency. In response to the criticisms over the decades, the World Bank has made progress. More of the World Bank’s decision making and country assessments are available publicly. The World Bank has continued to work with countries to combat corruption both at the country and bank levels. Expanding social issues in the fight on poverty. In 2001, the World Bank began to incorporate gender issues into its policy. “Two years later the World Bank announced that it was starting to evaluate all of its projects for their effects on women and girls,” noting that “poverty is experienced differently by men and women” and “a full understanding of the gender dimensions of poverty can significantly change the definition of priority policy and program interventions.” Robert J. Brym et al., “In Faint Praise of the World Bank’s Gender Development Policy,” Canadian Journal of Sociology Online , March–April 2005, accessed May 23, 2018, cjsonline. ca/articles/brymetal05.html. Improvements in countries’ competitiveness and increasing exports. The World Bank’s policies and its role as a donor have helped improve the ability of some countries to secure more of the global revenues for basic commodities. In Rwanda, for example, reforms transformed the country’s coffee industry and increased exports. Kenya has expanded its exports of cut flowers, and Uganda has improved its fish-processing industry. World Bank efforts have also helped African financial companies develop. Shanta Devarajan, “African Successes—Listing the Success Stories,” Africa Can…End Poverty (blog), The World Bank Group, September 17, 2009, accessed May 23, 2018, blogs. worldbank/africacan/african-successes-listing-the-success-stories. Improving efficiencies in diverse industries and leveraging the private sector. The World Bank has worked closely with businesses in the private sector to develop local infrastructure, including power, transportation, telecommunications, health care, and education. Shanta Devarajan, “African Successes—Listing the Success Stories,” Africa Can…End Poverty (blog), The World Bank Group, September 17, 2009, accessed May 23, 2018, blogs. worldbank/africacan/african-successes-listing-the-success-stories. In Afghanistan, for example, small dams are built and maintained by the locals themselves to support small industries processing local produce.
The World Bank continues to play an integral role in helping countries reduce poverty and improve the well-being of their citizens. World Bank funding provides a resource to countries to utilize the services of global companies to accomplish their objectives.
Key Takeaways.
The IMF is playing an expanding role in the global monetary system. The IMF’s key roles are the following:
To promote international monetary cooperation To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade To promote exchange stability To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments To give confidence to members by making the IMF’s general resources temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards To shorten the duration and lessen the degree of disequilibrium in the international balances of payments of members The World Bank consists of two main bodies, the IBRD and the International Development Association (IDA).
The World Bank Group includes the following interrelated institutions:
IBRD, which makes loans to countries with the purpose of building economies and reducing poverty IDA, which typically provides interest-free loans to countries with sovereign guarantees International Finance Corporation (IFC), which provides loans, equity, risk-management tools, and structured finance with the goal of facilitating sustainable development by improving investments in the private sector Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), which focuses on improving the foreign direct investment of the developing countries International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), which provides a means for dispute resolution between governments and private investors, with the end goal of enhancing the flow of capital.
(AACSB: Reflective Thinking, Analytical Skills)
What is the IMF, and what role does it play? What are two criticisms of the IMF and two of its opportunities for the future? Discuss whether SDRs or another global currency created by the IMF should replace the US dollar as the international reserve currency. What is the World Bank, and what role does it play? What are two criticisms of the World Bank and two of its opportunities for the future?

International Monetary Fund - IMF.
What is the 'International Monetary Fund - IMF'
The International Monetary Fund is an international organization that aims to promote global economic growth and financial stability, to encourage international trade, and to reduce poverty.
BREAKING DOWN 'International Monetary Fund - IMF'
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is based in Washington, D. C. and currently consists of 189 member countries, each of which has representation on the IMF's executive board in proportion to its financial importance, so that the most powerful countries in the global economy have the most voting power.
The IMF's website describes its mission as "to foster global monetary cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate international trade, promote high employment and sustainable economic growth, and reduce poverty around the world."
IMF Activities.
The IMF's primary methods for achieving these goals are monitoring, capacity building, and lending.
The IMF collects massive amounts of data on national economies, international trade, and the global economy in aggregate, as well as providing regularly updated economic forecasts at the national and international level. These forecasts, published in the World Economic Outlook, are accompanied by lengthy discussions of the effect of fiscal, monetary and trade policies on growth prospects and financial stability.
The IMF provides technical assitance, training and policy advice to member countries through its capacity building programs. These programs include training in data collection and analysis, which feed into the IMF's project of monitoring national and global economies.
The IMF makes loans to countries that are experiencing economic distress in order to prevent or mitigate financial crises. Members contribute the funds for this lending to a pool based on a quota system. These funds total around SDR 475 billion ($645 billion) as of Sept. 2017 (IMF assets are denominated in special drawing rights, a kind of quasi-currency that is comprised of set proportions of the world's reserve currencies).
IMF funds are often conditional on recipients making reforms to increase their growth potential and financial stability. Structural adjustement programs, as these conditional loans are known, have attracted criticism for exacerbating poverty and reproducing the structures of colonialism.
History of the IMF.
The IMF was originally created in 1945 as part of the Bretton Woods agreement, which attempted to encourage international financial cooperation by introducing a system of convertible currencies at fixed exchange rates, with the dollar redeemable for gold at $35 per ounce. The IMF oversaw this system: for example, a country was free to readjust its exchange rate by up to 10% in either direction, but larger changes required the IMF's permission.
The IMF also acted as a gatekeeper: countries were not eligible for membership in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) – a World Bank forerunner that the Bretton Woods agreement created in order to fund the reconstruction of Europe after World War II – unless they were members of the IMF.
Since the Bretton Woods system collapsed in the 1970s, the IMF has promoted the system of floating exchange rates, meaning that market forces determine the value of currencies relative to one another. This system continues to be in place today.

The international monetary and financial system.
The suitable design of international monetary and financial arrangements for the global economy is a long-standing issue. A key shortcoming of the existing system is that it tends to heighten the risk of financial imbalances, leading to booms and busts in credit and asset prices with serious macroeconomic consequences. These imbalances often occur simultaneously across countries, deriving strength from international spillovers of various types. The global use of the dollar and the euro allows monetary conditions to affect borrowers well beyond the respective issuing economies. Many countries also import monetary conditions when setting policy rates to limit interest rate differentials and exchange rate movements against the major currencies. The global integration of financial markets tends to reinforce these dynamics, by allowing common factors to drive capital flows and a common price of risk to move bond and equity prices. Policies to keep one's own house in order by managing financial cycles would help to reduce such spillovers. In addition, central banks need to better internalise spillovers, not least to avoid the effects of their actions spilling back into their own economies. Moving beyond enlightened self-interest would require international cooperation on rules constraining domestic policies.
The suitable design of international monetary and financial arrangements for the global economy is a long-standing issue in economics. Putting in place mechanisms that facilitate the achievement of sustained, non-inflationary and balanced growth has proved elusive. In the wake of the Great Financial Crisis, the issue has again gained prominence on the international policy agenda.
Just as in the past, however, there is little agreement on what the key shortcomings of the current international monetary and financial system (IMFS) are, let alone on what to do about them. A common diagnosis has been that the system is unable to prevent the build-up of unsustainable current account imbalances and that this, in turn, has induced a contractionary bias: surplus countries have no incentive to adjust, while deficit countries are forced to do so. Indeed, current account imbalances have been a focus of G20 cooperative efforts.
This chapter provides a different perspective, by arguing that the main shortcoming of existing arrangements is that they tend to compound the weaknesses of domestic monetary and financial frameworks ("regimes"). In particular, the IMFS tends to heighten the risk of financial imbalances - that is, unsustainable credit and asset price booms that overstretch balance sheets and can lead to financial crises and serious macroeconomic damage. These imbalances occur simultaneously across countries, deriving strength from global monetary ease and cross-border financing. Put differently, the system exhibits "excess financial elasticity": think of an elastic band that can be stretched out further but that, as a result, eventually snaps back all the more violently. 1.
The chapter is structured as follows. After outlining the key features of the IMFS, the first section explains and documents how the interaction of domestic monetary and financial regimes increases financial imbalances. It highlights several factors: (i) the role of monetary areas that for the key international currencies (notably the US dollar) extend well beyond national borders; (ii) the limited insulation properties of exchange rates, which induce policy responses designed to avoid large interest rate differentials vis-à-vis the main international currencies; and (iii) the powerful waves generated by freely mobile financial capital and global liquidity, which wash across currencies and borders, carrying financial conditions across the globe. The second section considers possible solutions. It highlights the need to adjust domestic policy frameworks and to strengthen international cooperation, going beyond the own-house-in-order doctrine.
The IMFS: main elements and weaknesses.
The IMFS comprises the arrangements governing transactions in goods, services and financial instruments among countries. Today, it consists of a set of domestically oriented policies in a world of largely free capital flows. Domestic monetary regimes focus mainly on price stability, while currencies are allowed to float to varying degrees: free floating among the principal international currencies coexists with greater or lesser management of other currencies. Financial regimes generally allow funds to move freely across currencies and borders, although some countries still impose restrictions. The main restraint on financial transactions takes the form of prudential regulation and supervision, in part based on internationally agreed standards.
Current arrangements differ markedly from the previous system, Bretton Woods (1946-73). At the time, the US dollar's convertibility into gold served as an external monetary anchor, and currencies were tied together through fixed but adjustable exchange rates (Table V.1). Domestic monetary regimes in general gave less priority to price stability and more to external balance and demand growth. While the anchor ultimately did not prove that strong, the arrangements contrast with present ones, in which the aggregation of monetary policies pursued under domestic mandates acts as the only overall constraint. During the Bretton Woods era, the leading international currency was the dollar, which now shares this role to some extent with others, mainly the euro. And international capital mobility was quite limited, reflecting a myriad of restrictions on "repressed" domestic financial systems.
The performance of the two systems has differed markedly as well. Bretton Woods did not see major episodes of financial instability, but eventually proved unable to ensure lasting global monetary stability. It broke down once the United States formally abandoned gold convertibility and exchange rates were allowed to float. Current arrangements have succeeded in promoting price stability more than financial stability.
Arguably, this is no coincidence. The 84th Annual Report , as further elaborated in other chapters of this Annual Report, explored why domestic monetary and financial regimes have so far been unable to ensure lasting financial stability. But their interaction through the IMFS has also played a role, by compounding rather than limiting the weaknesses of domestic regimes. Consider, in turn, the interaction of monetary and financial arrangements.
Interaction of domestic monetary regimes.
The interaction of monetary regimes spreads easy monetary conditions from core economies to the rest of the world. The international use of reserve currencies does so directly, and the strategic conduct of monetary policy does so indirectly. Take each in turn.
The reliance on a single global currency has diminished slowly since Bretton Woods, but the US dollar continues to play a dominant role in international trade and finance, alongside the euro. As a means of exchange, the dollar is on one side of no less than 87% of foreign exchange market transactions (Table V.2), with an even higher share of forward and swap transactions. Its dominance in foreign exchange markets makes the dollar the sole intervention currency outside Europe and Japan, which supports its high share in foreign exchange reserves. More than half of world trade is invoiced and settled in dollars, pointing to the greenback's pre-eminent role as a unit of account.
Remarkably, the advent of the euro and the dollar's trend depreciation since the 1970s have not materially challenged the dollar's role as a store of value (Graph V.1, left-hand panel). At 63%, it maintains almost three times the share of the euro in foreign exchange reserves. Its share in both official reserves and private portfolios is sustained by the scale of what can be termed the "dollar zone" of economies whose currencies move more closely with the dollar than with the euro (Box V. A). At half or more of world GDP, the dollar zone is far larger than the US economy, which is less than a quarter.
Monetary policy settings for key international currencies influence financial conditions outside these currencies' home jurisdictions directly through their impact on interest rates and the valuation of assets or liabilities denominated in these currencies but held or owed by non-residents. In particular, dollar and euro credit to non-bank borrowers outside the United States and euro area stood at $9.5 trillion and €2.3 trillion ($2.7 trillion), respectively, at end-2018. The dollar debt represents a seventh of global GDP outside the United States (Box V. B).
The large stocks of dollar - and euro-denominated credit extended to borrowers outside the United States and the euro area, respectively, mean that Federal Reserve and ECB policies are transmitted directly to other economies. The impact depends on the characteristics of the instrument in question, notably its maturity and the flexibility of the corresponding interest rate. For instance, in the case of bank loans priced off of dollar Libor or Euribor, changes in short-term policy rates pass through within weeks. Over half of dollar and euro credit to borrowers outside the United States and euro area remains in the form of bank loans.
The pass-through is slower for bonds, given their generally fixed rates and longer maturity, but then quantities can respond too. In particular, some stocks of dollar bonds have changed quite markedly in response to unconventional monetary policy (Chapter IV). Low yields reflecting the Federal Reserve's large-scale purchases of Treasury and agency bonds, among other factors, led US and global investors to seek yield in lower-quality bonds. The impact was especially pronounced for non-US borrowers, who between 2009 and 2018 ramped up their dollar bond issuance by $1.8 trillion (Graph V.2, left-hand panel). Investor demand for such bonds proved highly responsive to the compression of the term premium, as measured by the spread between Treasury bond yields and expected bill yields: the lower the premium, the faster the growth of dollar bonds issued by non-US borrowers (hence the negative relationship after the first quarter of 2009 seen in the right-hand panel of Graph V.2).
By the same token, the recent ECB large-scale bond purchases and compression of term premia on euro-denominated bonds raise the question of whether borrowers outside the euro area will take advantage of the funding opportunity. In fact, by the end of 2018 the stock of euro bonds issued by such borrowers was already growing as fast as its dollar counterpart.
Post-crisis, offshore dollar credit has grown fastest in those jurisdictions where it has been cheapest relative to local funding, especially emerging market economies (EMEs). 2 Authorities around the world use capital controls or macroprudential policy to raise the cost of dollar borrowing at home, but their policy reach does not extend to activities of multinational firms, which can borrow dollars (or euros) offshore to sidestep tight domestic funding conditions. This is one reason for the rapid growth in various quantitative measures of "global liquidity", which denotes the ease of financing in global financial markets (Box V. B).
Mapping the dollar and euro zones.
This box uses simple regression methods to place currencies in three zones of influence corresponding to the main international currencies based on the currencies' degree of co-movement. The three reference currencies are the dollar, the euro (before 1999, the Deutsche mark) and the yen, consistent with their status as the three most transacted currencies in the world in the BIS Triennial Central Bank Survey. Thus defined, the dollar zone accounts for nearly 60% of world GDP, far more than the US share in world GDP, which is between 20 and 25%.
The dollar share is calculated in two steps. First, each currency is placed in or between zones. Each currency's weekly percentage change against the dollar is regressed on the weekly percentage change of the euro/dollar and yen/dollar rates. The dollar zone weight is calculated as 1 minus the corresponding regression coefficients. For example, the Hong Kong dollar is pegged to the US dollar, so the coefficients are zero and the dollar zone weight is 1. For the intermediate case of sterling, in 2018 the pound's estimated coefficient is 0.60 on the euro/dollar rate and 0.09 on the yen/dollar, making the currency's dollar weight 1 - 0.60 - 0.09, or 0.31. The results in Graph V. A show the dollar to be more global, the euro to be more regional and the yen to lack much external influence. The dollar weights can thus be read in reverse as euro weights, eg with the dark blue area representing over 95% euro weight.
Second, the dollar share is calculated across currencies using (PPP) GDP weights. The dollar zone weight for each of the 40 economies (50 before the euro) is multiplied by the respective GDP, and the product is added to the US GDP. This sum is then expressed as a share of the total GDP of the 43 major economies analysed, including those of the United States, the euro area and Japan. Graph V.1 plots these aggregate zone shares of global GDP.
There is strong cross-sectional evidence that a currency's co-movement with the dollar shapes the currency composition of its external portfolio, both official and private. For the two dozen economies that disclose the currency composition of official reserves, the dollar zone weight accounts for about two thirds of the variation in the dollar share across countries. And in larger samples, the dollar zone weight is also strongly linked with the dollar share of cross-border bank deposits or loans and international bonds. The underlying motivation is the same for the official and private sectors: matching the portfolio weights to the co-movements of the domestic currency with major currencies serves to minimise the volatility of portfolio returns when measured in domestic currency.
See R McCauley and T Chan, "Currency movements drive reserve composition", BIS Quarterly Review , December 2018, pp 23-36.
Monetary regimes also interact indirectly, through central bank responses to each other's policies. Central banks seem to set their policy rates with an eye on those of the Federal Reserve or ECB. This behaviour is sometimes explicitly noted, as in the cases of the Central Bank of Norway and the Swiss National Bank with reference to ECB policy, but appears to be widespread.
One reason is to limit exchange rate movements. Exchange rate flexibility has often been described as insulating the domestic economy from external developments, but this insulation is often overstated. In particular, appreciation can lead lenders to consider firms with debts denominated in foreign currency as better capitalised and therefore more creditworthy, reducing perceived risks associated with lending and increasing the availability of credit. 3 Through this and other mechanisms, such as carry trades and momentum trading, currencies can overshoot, shrinking the traded goods sector and leaving the economy vulnerable to a turn in the ease of global financing. Then, depreciation can lead to financial distress among firms with foreign currency debt. During the dollar's downswing from 2002 to 2018 (with an interruption in late 2008), many central banks resisted unwelcome appreciation against the dollar, in setting their own policy rates and by intervening in the currency market.
Indeed, many countries - not only EMEs but also advanced economies - appear to have kept interest rates below those that traditional domestic benchmarks would indicate, partly in response to low rates in core currencies. In the 1990s, policy rates were broadly in line with the Taylor rule, a simple interest rate rule prescribing a mechanical reaction to the output gap and the deviation of inflation from target. In the early 2000s, however, actual policy rates drifted persistently below the levels implied by the Taylor rule, suggesting that monetary policy became systematically accommodative (Graph V.3). Many advanced economies apparently hesitated to raise interest rates during the boom, and have maintained them near zero since the crisis. For their part, EME authorities appear to have set policy rates low out of concern over capital flows and appreciation (Graph V.3, right-hand panel). The empirical significance of US interest rates in influencing policy rates elsewhere provides additional evidence for follow-the-leader behaviour (Box V. C). While this simple exercise has important limitations, it points to competitive easing as a way of sustaining external demand. More than 20 central banks have eased monetary policy since December 2018, some explicitly responding to external conditions (Chapter IV).
Global liquidity as global credit aggregates.
Over the past several years, the BIS has developed indicators to track global liquidity conditions. The term global liquidity is used to mean the ease of financing in global financial markets. Total credit outstanding is one of its main footprints, as it shows the extent to which bond markets and banks have led to the build-up of exposures. In covering US dollar and euro credit, this box focuses on the two largest components of global credit through which the monetary policies of the respective currency areas directly influence financial conditions in the rest of the world.
Global credit can be extended through bank loans or bonds, and each has a domestic and an international component. Graph V. B shows dollar - and euro-denominated debt, broken down by the location of the borrower. Some 80% of global non-financial dollar debt at end-2018 was incurred by US residents (top left-hand panel). Their liabilities include US public debt, US household debt and US corporate debt. But $9.5 trillion (19%) of dollar credit was extended to non-bank borrowers located outside the United States, and these entities are as exposed to the US monetary policy stance as US residents are. At 13% of non-US GDP, the stock of offshore dollar credit exceeds its euro counterpart worth $2.7 trillion (bottom left-hand panel). Compared with borrowing in US dollars, a larger share of overall borrowing in euros takes place from inside the same currency area (92%).
The international credit component tends to be more procyclical and volatile. International bank lending in both dollars and euros outpaced domestic credit in the boom that preceded the Great Financial Crisis, and contracted once the crisis broke out (Graph V. B, right-hand panels). Bond markets partly substituted for impaired bank lending in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, and increased demand for funding went hand in hand with higher yield spreads. Since 2018, the search for yield has enabled a surge in issuance at compressed spreads that has helped to push the share of bonds in international credit to 46%. In this second phase of global liquidity, bond markets and the asset management industry have taken centre stage in shaping global liquidity conditions.
Resistance to appreciation has also taken the form of currency intervention, which itself feeds back into global monetary ease. Many central banks have intervened directly in the foreign exchange market, typically buying dollars, and then investing the proceeds in bonds issued by the major governments. Unlike major central banks' large-scale domestic bond purchases, reserve managers have not sought to lower yields in the bond markets in which they invest. Nevertheless, the secular reserve accumulation and balance sheet policies of major central banks have combined to push estimated official bond holdings to more than $12 trillion out of the $31 trillion in US, euro area, Japanese and UK government bonds (Graph II.9, left-hand panel). Such holdings account for over half of the outstanding stock of US Treasury securities and more than 40% of the combined stock of Treasury and agency securities (Graph II.9, right-hand panel).
As a result, monetary policies of advanced and emerging market economies have reinforced each other. Easy monetary conditions at the centre have led to easy monetary and financial conditions in the rest of the world: there, firms and governments have boosted dollar and euro borrowing and authorities have resisted unwelcome currency appreciation. In turn, their foreign exchange intervention has raised official investment in major bond markets, further compressing bond yields there. With central banks and reserve managers bidding for duration shoulder to shoulder with pension funds and life insurers, bond yields have declined to record lows and the term premium has turned negative (Chapter II).
Interaction of financial regimes.
Financial market integration has allowed common global factors to drive capital flows and asset prices. The common factors have partly shifted between the two phases of global liquidity, pre - and post-crisis.
International monetary spillovers.
Over recent years, interest rates in EMEs and advanced economies moved closely together with interest rates in large advanced economies, particularly the United States. This close correlation could reflect the response to common macroeconomic developments affecting all countries. But it could also reflect global interest rate spillovers from large advanced economies. Interest rate spillovers can result from explicit exchange rate policies or attempts to contain exchange rate and capital flow pressures resulting from yield differentials vis-à-vis key currencies, and from global investor arbitrage tying capital market rates together.
To shed light on this question, a panel of 30 emerging market and advanced economies over the period 2000-14 is investigated in a regression analysis. The analysis shows a strong relationship between changes in interest rates prevailing in these economies and changes in US interest rates, even after controlling for domestic macroeconomic conditions and the global business and financial cycle. For short-term interest rates, a 100 basis point change in US rates is associated with an average 34 basis point change in emerging market and small advanced economies (Table V. C, first column). For long-term interest rates, the effect is stronger: a 100 basis point change in the US bond yield is associated with an average 59 basis point change in the yields of these economies (second column). Besides US interest rates, the degree of global investor risk aversion, as measured by the VIX, also consistently emerges as an important driver of these interest rates.
Furthermore, the persistently low global policy rates relative to Taylor rule-implied levels since the early 2000s (Graph V.3) reflect, at least in part, the effect of low policy rates prevailing in the United States over this period. Specifically, a 100 basis point cut in the US federal funds rate is found to lower EME and other advanced economy policy rates by 43 basis points relative to the levels implied by a standard normative Taylor rule (Table V. C, third column). When estimating a descriptive Taylor rule, the estimated impact of the US policy rate is even higher: some 70 basis points (fourth column). In sum, the results suggest an economically significant causal relationship from US interest rates to interest rates in emerging market and other advanced economies.
See B Hofmann and E Takáts, "International monetary spillovers", BIS Quarterly Review , forthcoming.
The bank flows that dominated in the first, pre-crisis, phase of global liquidity drew on easy leverage, predictable policy rates and low volatility, as proxied by the VIX. 4 These flows enabled domestic credit booms, freeing them from the constraint of the domestic funding base. In a sample of 31 EMEs between early 2002 and 2008, a rise in the share of cross-border bank funding, extended both directly to domestic non-banks and indirectly through banks, helped boost the ratio of bank credit to GDP (Graph V.4, left-hand panel). Banks found non-core liabilities abroad to fund booming credit at home. 5.
Analysis of a broader sample of 62 countries and a more inclusive measure of international capital flows points to a similar dynamic. Here, the larger the net debt inflows, including both portfolio and bank flows, the larger the increase in an economy's ratio of bank credit to GDP (Graph V.4, right-hand panel). The inclusion of Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom shows that a domestic credit boom's reliance on external financing is not a symptom of financial underdevelopment. In fact, in the subsample of 23 advanced economies the reliance on capital inflows is greater than among EMEs, as the steeper fitted line suggests.
In the second, post-crisis, phase of global liquidity, the term premium on sovereign bonds has become a more important driver of funding conditions. Although cross-border bank credit has continued to expand strongly in EMEs, it has contracted sharply among advanced economies, while bond financing has surged across the board. Even as bond flows have gained prominence, the term premium has emerged as the salient global price of risk in integrated financial markets.
Studies of the spillovers across global bond markets around official large-scale bond purchase announcements have highlighted the strong co-movement of bond yields. If investors treat bonds denominated in different currencies as close substitutes, purchases in one market also depress yields elsewhere. Table V.3 illustrates this point, summarising several studies that estimate the basis point moves in various advanced bond markets that correspond to a 100 basis point move in the US Treasury market. In addition, local currency EME bonds have also co-moved much more closely with Treasuries than a decade ago. 6.
Heretofore, the relationship across even major bond markets appeared asymmetric, with US bond yields driving those elsewhere, but in the past year this seems to have changed. In particular, there are signs that the euro area bond market has been moving its US counterpart. Anticipation of ECB large-scale bond purchases put downward pressure on French and German bond yields and, through co-movement of term premia, on US bond yields as well, despite the expected divergence in policy rates (Graph V.5, right-hand panel). This contrasts with the experience in early 1994, which epitomises previous patterns. At the time, the Federal Reserve was raising the policy rate while the Bank of France and the Deutsche Bundesbank were reducing theirs, but the backup in US bond yields was transmitted to Europe (Graph V.5, left-hand panel). 7.
To summarise, the workings of the IMFS post-crisis have spread easy monetary and financial conditions from the reserve currency areas to the rest of the world, just as they did pre-crisis. Global financial conditions have consequently loosened to an extent that may not prove consistent with lasting financial and macroeconomic stability. Credit booms in EMEs and some advanced economies less affected by the crisis have built up tell-tale financial imbalances. In the short run, the IMFS has tilted conditions towards expansion. But in the longer run, financial busts, were they to materialise, would tilt them towards contraction.
Monetary policy divergence across key currencies and renewed dollar appreciation pose risks. Ease in the euro area might prolong global ease, if firms and governments around the world can substitute euro funding for dollar funding. However, the large stock of dollar debt outstanding means that a tightening of dollar credit is likely to prove consequential. Thus, renewed dollar strength could expose vulnerabilities (Chapter III), especially in those firms that have collectively borrowed trillions of dollars. Admittedly, it is well known that the US economy has a short position in the dollar that funds a long position in other currencies. And by the same token, the rest of the world must hold more dollar assets than dollar liabilities and thus enjoy valuation gains in aggregate when the dollar appreciates. But even in a country with a long dollar position, the distribution of currency positions across sectors matters greatly for the outcome. For example, in many EMEs the official sector has a long dollar position whereas the corporate sector carries a short one (Box V. D). Absent transfers from the (gaining) official sector to the (losing) corporate sector, the economy may well be hurt by dollar strength.
Dollar strength, monetary policy divergence and heavy official holdings in the global bond market could lead to volatility. Were EMEs to draw down reserves substantially, their selling bonds in the key currencies could create unprecedented cross-currents in global bond markets. ECB and Bank of Japan bond purchases, EME selling and, eventually, the Federal Reserve's not rolling over maturing bonds could confront the remaining private investors with a difficult and shifting problem of bond pricing.
Limits and prospects in international policy coordination.
Policies to address the issues raised in this chapter require more than each country managing its inflation and business cycle. A broader notion of keeping one's house in order suggests policymakers deploy monetary, prudential and fiscal policies to manage financial cycles to ensure lasting monetary, financial and macroeconomic stability (Chapters I and IV). The resulting reduction in the frequency and depth of credit booms and busts would greatly reduce negative cross-country spillovers.
Valuation effects of dollar appreciation.
This box uses the example of Korea to illustrate that dollar appreciation can deliver wealth gains to non-US residents as a whole, while still representing a tightening of financial conditions for non-US firms that have funded themselves in the dollar. The Korean official sector can gain from dollar appreciation but need not adjust its spending, while the Korean corporate sector can lose net worth and face tighter credit.
It is by now well known that dollar appreciation boosts US net international liabilities. This is because US residents have dollar-denominated liabilities to the rest of the world that exceed their corresponding assets to the tune of 39% of GDP. With the appreciation of the dollar in 2018, the US net international investment position declined from -$5.4 trillion to -$6.9 trillion, as US assets stopped growing in dollar terms despite rising local currency valuations. This $1.5 trillion difference was more than three times the current account of $410 billion. Accordingly, the rest of the world's wealth increased.
Typical of the rest of the world, Korea's net international investment position as a whole gained from dollar appreciation. Still, Korean firms that have borrowed dollars can still see their net worth fall. Overall, the country's modestly positive ($82 billion in Table V. D) external position shows net foreign currency assets of $719 billion, with over half held by the official sector (official reserve assets of $364 billion) and substantial holdings by institutional investors (portfolio assets of $204 billion). A substantial fraction of portfolio and other foreign currency liabilities ($348 billion), and $65 billion of foreign currency loans booked by banks in Korea, are owed by the corporate sector. Moreover, BIS data show an additional $7 billion of mostly dollar bonds issued by offshore affiliates of Korean non-financial firms, and there is also offshore bank credit. Dollar appreciation leads to official gains that are not conveyed to firms that lose net worth.
Much analysis of international balance sheets, in general, and the insurance afforded by foreign exchange reserve holdings, in particular, implicitly suffers from a fallacy of division, according to which what is true of the whole is true of the parts. In the absence of transfers made when the domestic currency depreciates - which would themselves be fraught with moral hazard - the gains in the public sector do not offset corporate losses. Firms need to adjust their spending and hiring. And if the authorities eventually deploy international reserves to provide dollar liquidity to banks and firms, the intervention may follow disruptions that have already exacted a price.
See C Tille, "The impact of exchange rate movements on US foreign debt", Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Current Issues in Economics and Finance , vol 9, no 1, January 2003.
In addition, policymakers could give more weight to international interactions, including shared exposures, spillovers and feedbacks, with a view to keeping the global village in order. Policies could either seek to prevent crises, through measures to restrain the build-up of financial imbalances, or to strengthen crisis management, including through safety nets. An ounce of crisis prevention is worth a pound of crisis management: there are clear welfare benefits from reducing the incidence and severity of crises and clear limits of foresight and moral hazard in designing effective safety nets.
International policy coordination can occur at various depths. Enlightened self-interest takes international spillovers into account to the extent that they spill back on one's own economy. However, even if countries did their best individually, this would still fall short of the mark if there were significant international spillovers, as in today's era of global liquidity. Moving towards a more efficient outcome would require greater cooperation, including ad hoc joint action, and possibly even agreement on rules of the game that constrain domestic policies.
Obstacles present themselves in terms of both analysis and cooperation. There is the difficulty of agreeing on a diagnosis of what ails the IMFS. And even if a common understanding of international spillovers and their causes emerged, it would remain challenging to forge and to maintain a common approach among multiple actors of varying sizes subject to differing domestic constraints.
Such possibilities and obstacles are evident in the discussion concerning crisis management. During the Great Financial Crisis, central banks proved able to make swift joint adjustments to their policy stances and to coordinate closely in extending foreign exchange swaps to each other. Funding extended under dollar swaps reached almost $600 billion (and, under euro swaps, €6 billion). The dollar swap lines supported financial stability by allowing the funding of foreign banks with limited access to Federal Reserve facilities. In turn, they also restored the monetary transmission mechanism after banks had been bidding up dollar Libor relative to the federal funds rate.
Today, proposals to modify and extend safety nets face obstacles. One reason is deep analytical disagreement. Is reserve accumulation a by-product of exchange rate management, or a form of self-insurance against domestic and external crises? Should international liquidity facilities, including currency swap lines between central banks, be broadened, and what is their best design? Would enhanced safety nets lead to smaller foreign exchange reserves? And, even if agreement were reached, many aspects of international risk-sharing would remain problematic. Despite the room for improvement, the status quo may well persist.
All this reinforces the case for crisis prevention. Here, central banks could seek to internalise the effects of their own policies. An improved exchange of information would help authorities to reach a better understanding of international spillovers and spillbacks. For instance, if the major central banks' monetary policies have indeed induced competitive easing among EMEs, the resulting financial imbalances may ultimately hurt the advanced economies. What is more, such spillbacks may be stronger than in the past, in line with EMEs' growing weight in the world economy (Chapter III). Similarly, the outsize official role in major bond markets points to the need for policymakers to pay attention to global effects. However, while global reserve managers might collectively benefit from taking into account the effect of their investment behaviour on global bond yields, their individual incentive is to ignore international spillovers.
Consolidating the US external balance sheet.
Much of international macroeconomics assumes that national borders delimit currency zones and decision-making units. Just as the national accounts do, it assumes that those borders define the relevant economic territory: different currencies do not compete within a given country and firms operate exclusively within national borders. In reality, neither is the case. Not only does the domain of major currencies extend outside their country of issue (Boxes V. A and V. B), but multinational firms, be they financial or non-financial, operate across borders. Management focuses on group-wide profits and risks, and balance sheets span national boundaries. A consolidated perspective better reflects the reach of multinational firms and the extent of global integration.
This box uses the US example to illustrate how such a consolidated view of foreign assets and liabilities differs from the official international investment position (IIP) recorded on a residence basis - the defining criterion of the national accounts and balance of payment statistics. These are denoted "locational" in the first two columns of Table V. E. The process of consolidation aligns balance sheets with the nationality of ownership rather than with the location where the assets and liabilities are booked. This amounts to redrawing the US border to include the foreign balance sheets of US-owned firms, and to exclude the US balance sheets of foreign firms. This consolidation is performed here for the banking sector and the non-bank business sector (multinational companies).
The first step replaces the banks' external positions with consolidated BIS data (three rows under "bank-reported" in Table V. E). This removes all cross-border claims of, say, BNP Paribas New York on the rest of the world (these being French assets), and adds JPMorgan's consolidated foreign claims, yielding a total of $3.330 trillion for reporting US banks combined. Similarly, on the liabilities side, out goes any cross-border liability of BNP Paribas New York, and in comes JPMorgan's global foreign liabilities, to give an estimated $2.958 trillion for US banks. Moreover, foreign banks' local operations in the United States, which are not part of the US external position, further add to US consolidated assets and liabilities, respectively, to the extent that US residents provide funding ($2.465 trillion) to, or receive credit ($3.150 trillion) from, the US offices of foreign banks. Consolidating banks raises the sum of US foreign assets and liabilities from $40 trillion (IIP) to $45 trillion.
The second step consolidates foreign-owned multinational companies (excluding banks) in an analogous, though coarser, way (owing to data limitations). The cross-border direct investment positions of non-banks, assets and liabilities, are replaced by the (larger) total assets of US multinationals outside the United States and by those of foreign multinationals in the United States, respectively (rows under "direct investment" in Table V. E). Out goes General Electric's equity position in its French subsidiary, and in comes that subsidiary's total assets, resulting in $20,250 billion for all US-owned multinationals combined. These assets exceed the corresponding ownership claims (consisting of $5,078 billion worth of equity and equity-like inter-affiliate debt in the IIP) because US multinationals also borrow abroad; these liabilities (an estimated $15,173 billion) in turn add to US foreign liabilities. As for foreign multinationals, French firm Total's stake in its US subsidiary is removed, and its US assets are added - yielding $9,920 billion for foreign multinationals. Foreign multinationals' liabilities ($6,863 billion) count as a US foreign asset. This step sextuples directly held corporate assets and liabilities, but leaves US net assets unchanged.
Together, consolidating banks and multinational companies more than doubles the gross foreign position of the United States. US external assets and liabilities combined jump from $40 trillion on a residence basis (IIP) to an estimated $89 trillion when measured on a consolidated basis. The example reveals that the US economy is more open, and its foreign balance sheet larger, than is apparent from the external position derived from the balance of payments. The calculation of the US current account, on the other hand, should not be affected by consolidation, since foreign earnings are included in net investment income whether they are repatriated or not.
It may be difficult to go beyond enlightened self-interest and to revisit rules of the game more broadly. 8 Many reject a global perspective in the realm of monetary policy. Accordingly, domestic mandates ask major reserve-issuing central banks to set policy for a smaller economic domain than that occupied by their currencies.
This interpretation of domestic mandates contrasts sharply with successful international cooperation in the realm of financial regulation and supervision. There, national mandates have not precluded extensive international cooperation and the development of global rules.
A better understanding of the shortcomings of the current IMFS would already be a big step forward. A widely held view is that the main problem is the IMFS's apparent inability to prevent large current account imbalances. This view of imbalances is the prevailing one in international forums and implies specific adjustment policies, such as those associated with the G20 Mutual Assessment Process. 9.
The focus on current accounts and the corresponding net resource flows, however, arguably glosses over the IMFS's fundamental weakness. The aim of rebalancing global demand reduces the notion of imbalances to net flows in goods and services between countries, and neglects the greater risk of financial imbalances building up within and across countries. To be sure, large current account deficits often point to underlying problems, but financial booms and busts can and do develop in surplus countries as well. An aggregate surplus position may well conceal such vulnerabilities. Financial imbalances are more closely linked to domestic and international gross positions, and need not leave a mark on cross-border net flows - what current accounts represent. 10 Indeed, financial imbalances may not show up in a country's balance of payments at all if multinationals issue debt offshore for their use abroad, for instance. This, in turn, raises the question of the appropriate unit of analysis in international finance, with consequences for how one should measure the risks (Box V. E). Making progress on the design of the IMFS thus calls for a new diagnosis that accounts for financial imbalances as a basis for broad adjustments to domestic policy regimes and their international interaction.
2 See R McCauley, P McGuire and V Sushko, "Global dollar credit: links to US monetary policy and leverage", Economic Policy , vol 30, issue 82, April 2018, pp 189-229.
3 See V Bruno and H S Shin, "Cross-border banking and global liquidity", Review of Economic Studies , vol 82, issue 2, April 2018, pp 535-64.
4 See H Rey, "Dilemma not trilemma: the global financial cycle and monetary policy independence", in Global dimensions of unconventional monetary policy , proceedings of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Jackson Hole symposium, August 2018, pp 285-333.
5 See J-H Hahm, H S Shin and K Shin, "Noncore bank liabilities and financial vulnerability", Journal of Money, Credit and Banking , vol 45, issue s1, April 2018, pp 3-36.
8 The case for change has been put forward by R Rajan, "Competitive monetary easing: is it yesterday once more?", remarks at the Brookings Institution, 10 April 2018. For more sceptical views on policy coordination, see eg S Fischer, "The Federal Reserve and the global economy", Per Jacobsson Foundation Lecture at the IMF/World Bank Annual Meetings, 11 October 2018; and B Cœuré, "Domestic and cross-border spillovers of unconventional monetary policies", remarks at the Swiss National Bank-IMF conference "Monetary policy challenges in a changing world", 12 May 2018. See also J Caruana, "The international monetary and financial system: eliminating the blind spot", remarks at the IMF conference "Rethinking macro policy III: progress or confusion?", 16 April 2018; and W Dudley, "US monetary policy and emerging market economies", remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York roundtable discussion "Three decades of crises: what have we learned?", 27 March 2018.
9 The European Commission's Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure goes further in complementing its surveillance of external imbalances with indicators on internal financial imbalances.

Factsheet.
Artigos relacionados.
Assinatura de notificação de e-mail.
FMI e Organização Mundial do Comércio.
12 de outubro de 2017.
The IMF and the WTO are international organizations with about 150 members in common. Enquanto o foco central do FMI é sobre o sistema monetário e financeiro internacional, e a OMC está no sistema de comércio internacional, ambos trabalham em conjunto para garantir um sistema de som para comércio e pagamentos globais.
What objectives do the IMF and the WTO have in common?
O Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI) é uma organização internacional de 189 países membros que trabalha para assegurar a estabilidade do sistema monetário e financeiro internacional. O mandato do FMI inclui facilitar a expansão e o crescimento equilibrado do comércio internacional, promovendo a estabilidade cambial e proporcionando a oportunidade para a correção ordenada dos países & rsquo; problemas de balança de pagamentos. O FMI foi criado em 1945.
A Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC) é uma organização internacional de 164 membros que lida com as regras do comércio entre as nações. Com a adesão da Rússia em agosto de 2018, a OMC engloba todas as principais economias comerciais. A OMC trabalha para ajudar o comércio internacional a fluir de forma consistente, previsível e livremente, e fornece aos países uma saída construtiva e justa para lidar com disputas sobre questões comerciais. A OMC surgiu em 1995, sucedendo o Acordo Geral sobre Tarifas e Comércio (GATT), que foi estabelecido em 1947.
O trabalho do FMI e da OMC é complementar. Um sistema financeiro internacional sólido é necessário para apoiar o comércio internacional vibrante, enquanto o comércio fluente de fluxo ajuda a reduzir o risco de desequilíbrios de pagamentos e de crise financeira. As duas instituições trabalham juntas para garantir um sistema forte de comércio internacional e pagamentos abertos a todos os países. Esse sistema é fundamental para permitir o crescimento econômico, aumentar o nível de vida e reduzir a pobreza em todo o mundo.
Como o FMI e a OMC trabalham juntos.
O FMI ea OMC trabalham em conjunto em vários níveis, com o objetivo de assegurar uma maior coerência na elaboração de políticas econômicas globais. Um acordo de cooperação entre as duas organizações, que abrange vários aspectos de sua relação, foi assinado logo após a criação da OMC.
Consulta regular: O FMI tem status de observador em certos órgãos da OMC e pode participar de reuniões de certos comitês e grupos de trabalho da OMC. O Secretariado da OMC participa das reuniões do Conselho Executivo do FMI ou do Comitê do Conselho de Relacionamento com o Banco Mundial e outras organizações internacionais sobre assuntos de interesse comum. As questões comerciais de macro-crítica podem incluir atividades de vigilância do Fundo e podem ser abordadas no contexto de programas apoiados pelo FMI, quando necessário, para atender aos objetivos do programa. Da mesma forma, os relatórios de vigilância do FMI são insumos importantes para os relatórios periódicos da OMC nos países membros e rsquo; políticas comerciais (Revisões de Política Comercial).
Os acordos da OMC exigem que consulte o FMI quando trata de questões relativas a reservas monetárias, balança de pagamentos e acordos cambiais. Por exemplo, esses acordos permitem que os países apliquem restrições comerciais em caso de dificuldades de balança de pagamentos. O Comitê de Balança de Pagamentos da OMC baseia suas avaliações de restrições em parte considerável na determinação do IMF sobre a situação da balança de pagamentos de um membro.
A consulta informal entre o pessoal do FMI e a Secretaria da OMC ocorre regularmente em relação à política comercial e à evolução econômica global, bem como em conselhos para países individuais. Exemplos de consultas incluem visitas de funcionários seniores do FMI à OMC, e vice-versa, para fazer apresentações e participar de discussões sobre questões de interesse comum. O FMI, a OMC e o Banco Mundial realizam uma conferência regular para facilitar a troca de opiniões entre os acadêmicos, a sociedade civil e o pessoal das três organizações sobre questões comerciais atuais. O seminário inaugural do Comércio Misto do FMI / Banco Mundial / OMC foi realizado em dezembro de 2018; a segunda conferência ocorreu em junho de 2018, enquanto o terceiro foi hospedado pelo FMI em novembro de 2018, o quarto foi organizado pela OMC em junho de 2018, e o quinto foi hospedado pelo Banco Mundial em novembro de 2018.
Assistência técnica e treinamento: O FMI, a OMC e outras organizações e doadores internacionais trabalham em conjunto para ajudar os países a melhorar sua capacidade de comércio. O quadro integrado reforçado (FEI) para a assistência técnica relacionada com o comércio aos países menos desenvolvidos (PMA) apoia os países menos desenvolvidos a serem jogadores mais ativos no sistema comercial global, ajudando-os a combater as restrições do comércio ao comércio.
Assistência do Fundo para a liberalização do comércio: O Mecanismo de Integração Comercial (TIM), estabelecido em abril de 2004, está disponível para todos os países membros do Fundo cujas posições na balança de pagamentos podem sofrer, embora temporariamente, como resultado da liberalização multilateral do comércio. Não é uma facilidade de empréstimo, mas sim uma política destinada a tornar os recursos do Fundo mais previsivelmente disponíveis nas instalações existentes do FMI.
Coordenação de alto nível: o Diretor Gerente do FMI e o Diretor-Geral da OMC consultam regularmente uma série de questões relacionadas ao comércio. O Primeiro Diretor-Geral Adjunto participou da Conferência Ministerial da OMC de dezembro de 2005 em Hong Kong, na China, e na Reunião do Conselho Geral da OMC de novembro de 2007 em Genebra. A Administração participou da Quarta Revisão Global da Ajuda ao Comércio, organizada pela OMC em julho de 2018. Por fim, a administração de ambas as instituições freqüentemente participa das oficinas de comércio conjunto do FMI / Banco Mundial / OMC.
No futuro, a cooperação e a consulta entre o FMI e a OMC continuarão a ser fundamentais, tendo em vista o aumento das áreas de apoio e responsabilidades mútuas entre as duas instituições. As áreas potenciais de maior interação incluem serviços financeiros e facilitação do comércio. O FMI apoia firmemente o papel da OMC na garantia da abertura, transparência e estabilidade no sistema comercial global, incluindo o seu papel na aplicação das regras comerciais.

About the IMF.
About the IMF.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is an organization of 189 countries, working to foster global monetary cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate international trade, promote high employment and sustainable economic growth, and reduce poverty around the world.
Created in 1945, the IMF is governed by and accountable to the 189 countries that make up its near-global membership.
Fichas técnicas.
Key Issues.
Publicações.
Perspectiva Econômica Mundial.
Relatório de Estabilidade Financeira Global.
Monitor Fiscal.
Regional Economic Outlooks.
Finanças & amp; Desenvolvimento.
Relatório Anual 2017.
Assinatura de notificação de e-mail.
The IMF at a Glance.
Why the IMF was created and how it works.
The IMF, also known as the Fund, was conceived at a UN conference in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, United States, in July 1944. The 44 countries at that conference sought to build a framework for economic cooperation to avoid a repetition of the competitive devaluations that had contributed to the Great Depression of the 1930s.
The IMF's responsibilities: The IMF's primary purpose is to ensure the stability of the international monetary system—the system of exchange rates and international payments that enables countries (and their citizens) to transact with each other. The Fund's mandate was updated in 2018 to include all macroeconomic and financial sector issues that bear on global stability.
Fatos rápidos.
Membership: 189 countries Headquarters: Washington, D. C. Executive Board: 24 Directors each representing a single country or a group of countries Staff: Approximately 2,700 from 148 countries Total quotas: US$668 billion (as of 9/13/16) Additional pledged or committed resources: US$ 668 billion Committed amounts under current lending arrangements (as of 9/8/16): US$159 billion, of which US$144 billion have not been drawn (see table). Biggest borrowers (amounts outstanding as of 8/31/16): Portugal, Greece, Ukraine, Pakistan Biggest precautionary loans (amount agreed as of 9/8/16): Mexico, Poland, Colombia, Morocco Surveillance consultations: 130 consultations in 2018 and 132 in 2018, and 124 in 2018 Capacity development: 274 person years in FY2018, 285 in FY2018, and 288 in FY2018 Original aims: promote international monetary cooperation; facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade; promote exchange stability; assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments; and make resources available (with adequate safeguards) to members experiencing balance of payments difficulties.
The IMF’s fundamental mission is to ensure the stability of the international monetary system. It does so in three ways: keeping track of the global economy and the economies of member countries; lending to countries with balance of payments difficulties; and giving practical help to members.
Surveillance.
The IMF oversees the international monetary system and monitors the economic and financial policies of its 189 member countries. As part of this process, which takes place both at the global level and in individual countries, the IMF highlights possible risks to stability and advises on needed policy adjustments.
A core responsibility of the IMF is to provide loans to member countries experiencing actual or potential balance of payments problems. This financial assistance enables countries to rebuild their international reserves, stabilize their currencies, continue paying for imports, and restore conditions for strong economic growth, while undertaking policies to correct underlying problems. Unlike development banks, the IMF does not lend for specific projects.
Capacity Development.
IMF capacity development—technical assistance and training—helps member countries design and implement economic policies that foster stability and growth by strengthening their institutional capacity and skills. The IMF seeks to build on synergies between technical assistance and training to maximize their effectiveness.
Organization & Finances.
The IMF has a management team and 17 departments that carry out its country, policy, analytical, and technical work. One department is charged with managing the IMF’s resources. This section also explains where the IMF gets its resources and how they are used.
Gestão.
The IMF has a Managing Director, who is head of the staff and Chairperson of the Executive Board. The Managing Director is appointed by the Executive Board for a renewable term of five years and is assisted by a First Deputy Managing Director and three Deputy Managing Directors.
The IMF’s employees come from all over the world; they are responsible to the IMF and not to the authorities of the countries of which they are citizens. The IMF staff is organized mainly into area; functional; and information, liaison, and support responsibilities.
IMF resources.
Most resources for IMF loans are provided by member countries, primarily through their payment of quotas.
Quota subscriptions are a central component of the IMF’s financial resources. Each member country of the IMF is assigned a quota, based broadly on its relative position in the world economy.
Special Drawing Rights (SDR)
O SDR é um bem de reserva internacional, criado pelo FMI em 1969 para complementar seus países membros e rsquo; reservas oficiais.
Gold remains an important asset in the reserve holdings of several countries, and the IMF is still one of the world’s largest official holders of gold.
Borrowing arrangements.
While quota subscriptions of member countries are the IMF's main source of financing, the Fund can supplement its quota resources through borrowing if it believes that they might fall short of members' needs.
Governança.
Governance Structure.
The IMF has evolved along with the global economy throughout its 70-year history, allowing the organization to retain a central role within the international financial architecture.
Country Representation.
Unlike the General Assembly of the United Nations, where each country has one vote, decision making at the IMF was designed to reflect the relative positions of its member countries in the global economy. The IMF continues to undertake reforms to ensure that its governance structure adequately reflects fundamental changes taking place in the world economy.
Prestação de contas.
Created in 1945, the IMF is governed by and accountable to the 189 countries that make up its near-global membership.
Corporate Responsibility.
The Fund actively promotes good governance within its own organization.
The IMF has played a part in shaping the global economy since the end of World War II.
Cooperation and reconstruction (1944–71)
As the Second World War ends, the job of rebuilding national economies begins. The IMF is charged with overseeing the international monetary system to ensure exchange rate stability and encouraging members to eliminate exchange restrictions that hinder trade.
The end of the Bretton Woods System (1972–81)
After the system of fixed exchange rates collapses in 1971, countries are free to choose their exchange arrangement. Oil shocks occur in 1973–74 and 1979, and the IMF steps in to help countries deal with the consequences.
Debt and painful reforms (1982–89)
The oil shocks lead to an international debt crisis, and the IMF assists in coordinating the global response.
Societal Change for Eastern Europe and Asian Upheaval (1990–2004)
The IMF plays a central role in helping the countries of the former Soviet bloc transition from central planning to market-driven economies.
Globalization and the Crisis (2005 - present)
The implications of the continued rise of capital flows for economic policy and the stability of the international financial system are still not entirely clear. The current credit crisis and the food and oil price shock are clear signs that new challenges for the IMF are waiting just around the corner.